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The Changed Nature of Strategic Air Attack
MARK J. CONVERSINO

From Parameters, Winter 1997-98, pp. 28-41.

Strategic bombing doesn't matter." With that, Dartmouth political scientist Robert Pape dismissed an entire airpower
mission as essentially irrelevant to contemporary, non-nuclear warfare.[1] His book, Bombing to Win, a comprehensive
examination of the employment of "strategic" airpower, is, however, undermined by his reliance on a flawed and
outdated paradigm. Pape continues to view "strategic" in obsolescent terms that relate to the platform employed or the
target attacked. He is hardly alone in holding this view.[2]
The concept of strategic bombing, or more appropriately strategic attack, has been central to discussions and
arguments over airpower's "proper" role in conventional warfare. Zealots and partisans on both sides of the issue in
turn have made this specific air mission synonymous with airpower in general and an independent air force in
particular. Meanwhile, airpower's potential contribution to a military decision or other strategic objectives is lost in the
din generated in what amounts to arguments over side issues.[3] The strategic employment of airpower has changed,
conceptually if not in fact. If we are to fully appreciate airpower's role in national security, it is important that we first
understand "strategic" attack.
This article, therefore, seeks to redefine strategic attack to clarify the role of airpower in conventional warfare. The
article is not intended to serve as an airpower primer, nor is it a historical overview of what is commonly called
strategic bombing. Issues surrounding the employment of nuclear weapons are also beyond its scope. Furthermore, the
debate over whether strategic attack "works" or not will probably continue to provide academics and others with a
secure source of income for years, and that specific issue is simply too broad for any article to address adequately. Nor
do I consider the nonviolent application of airpower, even though missions such as airlift may also generate strategic
outcomes. For the sake of time and space, this article focuses exclusively on strategic attack.
Context
One cannot understand the concept of strategic attack in the absence of a definition of the strategic level of warfare.
Joint Publication 1-02 defines the strategic level of war as "the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a
group of nations, determines the national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and
guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives." It is at this level that military
planners develop "global plans and theater war plans to achieve those objectives." By definition, then, strategic attacks
produce effects that are not limited to a single theater of operations and may also directly fulfill national or
multinational objectives. This is a straightforward linkage of an airpower mission to a corresponding level of war.
Recognizing the nature of strategic attack, however, will be far more difficult than defining it.
Strategic bombing, in its historical context, has been the subject of dozens of scholarly studies. By 1918, all the major
powers had waged strategic air warfare, attacking their enemies' cities and industry first with airships and later with
multi-engine bombers. During the interwar period, airmen and theorists from several countries, including the United
States, examined the rather slender body of evidence from "strategic" operations in the Great War. From that record of
accomplishment, they extrapolated the effects of aerial attack against the populations and economies of modern,
industrial states. Often termed "true believers," these classical air theorists, men such as Italy's Giulio Douhet, Britain's
Hugh Trenchard, and America's Billy Mitchell, asserted that bomber aircraft could bypass an enemy's surface defenses
and strike at the heart of his centers of population and industry, collapsing both his will and ability to continue
fighting.[4]
While the classical theorists differed in terms of targeting strategies, as a group they believed that airpower had

fundamentally changed the ways in which major powers would wage war. Long-range bombing aircraft, they
maintained, could avoid the awful carnage so recently experienced in the trenches of World War I. Each believed that
strategic attacks also had the potential to win wars independently through physical destruction inflicted on the enemy
nation and, more important, the effects that such unprecedented assaults would have on the morale of the enemy's
civilian population.
Early airpower theories of necessity reflected existing technology. In the days before the development of radar,
airpower advocates considered a strategic attack difficult to intercept and impossible to stop. Furthermore, by the late
1920s, the state of bomber technology appeared to permit only area attacks against urban (and therefore, industrial)
targets. Overestimating the ability of existing bombers to find, hit, and destroy their assigned targets, the true believers
of the interwar period confidently predicted that future wars would be intensely violent and bloody but in ways
different from that of 1914-1918. Indeed, the supposedly weak morale of the rabble that they assumed inhabited
modern industrial cities would collapse quickly under aerial assault. Armies in the field, deprived of sustenance and
replacements, would sit uselessly in their trenches while panicked and enraged mobs took to the streets to demand an
end to the war. To a world still traumatized by the horrors of the Great War, the theory of strategic bombing offered
the means to avoid sacrificing the next generation of young men in the same pointless manner in which the previous
generation had perished.[5]
Evolution of the Concept
Unfortunately, much of what passes for informed debate on the utility of strategic attack consists of attempts to either
prove or disprove the ideas of the classical airpower theorists, particularly those of Italian Air Marshal Giulio Douhet.
While the development and application of American airpower owes as much, if not more, to the theories and writings
of Billy Mitchell and the faculty of the Air Corps Tactical School, Douhet has served as a convenient foil for the
debate over strategic airpower. Douhet was, in fact, the first to write a comprehensive theory of airpower, a vision
characterized by an extreme set of assertions. His book, The Command of the Air, first published in 1921, ostensibly
for an Italian audience, addressed air warfare in terms theoretically applicable to any industrialized state. "To conquer
command of the air," he asserted, "means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat." Once a state had seized
command of the air, it would then unleash its bombers against the enemy's urban and industrial centers. Using a mix of
high explosives, incendiaries, and chemical weapons, Douhet's bombers would spread terror and panic throughout the
enemy's population. Though terrible to contemplate, he posited, such an aerial assault was actually humane; wars
would end quickly, and the grinding carnage of trench warfare would be avoided. In short, a Douhetan strategy
involved widespread destruction and the indiscriminate slaughter of the enemy's population.[6]
Douhet's influence on airpower thought and employment, in Italy as well as elsewhere, remains a point of historical
debate. Likewise, a consensus does not exist as to the extent of the Italian's influence on the theorists of the Air Corps
Tactical School (ACTS). Paradoxically, in 1933 Major Hal George, a member of the ACTS faculty, translated
Douhet's manuscript into English. That same year, Lieutenant Colonel Don Wilson took control of the school's
curriculum. Wilson considered Douhet's emphasis on massive and indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations
"wanton and ineffective." What emerged from ACTS, therefore, was a theory centered on precision strikes against
readily identifiable "vital targets."[7] In practice, technical limitations often resulted in significant amounts of collateral
damage to civilian infrastructure. But this destruction was just that: collateral and unintended. Indeed, with the
exception of the raids on Japanese cities after March 1945, the United States has never followed a Douhetan strategy.
More recently, the strategic portion of the air campaign against Iraq was the very antithesis of Douhetan theory.
Greenpeace's William Arkin, while questioning the effectiveness of strategic attack against Iraq, proclaimed the air war
"clean on a strategic level."[8]
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Desert Storm, the specter of Douhet loomed over postwar assessments of the strategic
campaign. Advocates claimed that the air campaign vindicated Douhet's theories nearly five decades after the airpower
experience of World War II seemed to undermine them. At the same time, partisans on the other side of the issue,
fearful lest airpower receive undue credit for victory in the Gulf, exhumed Douhet's ideas and, absent victory through
airpower over Saddam Hussein, once more proclaimed him "wrong."[9]
Both sides of this argument have missed the point; Douhet is dead, literally and figuratively. Radical changes in

technology and political realities consigned him long ago to the history books. Those who have sought to question the
wisdom of strategic attack by invoking his flawed vision are as intellectually stagnant as those who seek support for it
from the few elements of his broader theories that remain valid. The essence of Douhet is widespread and purposeful
death and destruction, a vision an American or allied task force is not likely to share under any foreseeable
circumstances. Attempting to "prove" or "disprove" his theories without a recognition of this central tenet of Douhetan
strategy is a hollow, useless argument. Air Force Historian Dr. Richard P. Hallion, a clear airpower "advocate,"
admonished airmen that they cannot afford to "continue to draw our doctrinal and strategic sense from the great
airpower prophets of the past--the Douhets, and Trenchards, and Mitchells--men who wrote over 60 years ago."[10]
Non-airmen would do well to heed this advice too.
Ironically, RAND analyst Bernard Brodie wrote that the advent of nuclear weapons made Douhet "relevant," despite
the experience of World War II. Indeed, the Cold War policy of nuclear deterrence stifled creative thought about
strategic airpower; a "strategic" attack was synonymous with a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. The notion of a
conventional strategic attack virtually disappeared. At the same time, according to Air Vice Marshal Tony Mason, the
term "tactical" denoted airpower employed "in support of a surface battle in a particular theater."[11]
Only in the late 1980s, coincident with signs of the impending end of the Cold War, did the US Air Force begin to
think once again about conventional strategic air attack. For example, in 1988, General John T. Chain, then
commander of the Strategic Air Command, wrote an article for Strategic Review entitled "Strategic Bombers in
Conventional Warfare." The title alone is instructive, implying that the idea of "strategic," that is, nuclear, bombers
playing a conventional, non-nuclear role might be novel to the journal's readers. General Chain sought to point out that
long-range heavy bombers were not exclusively nuclear weapon carriers and that "the terms `strategic' and `tactical'
describe actions, not weapons." Nevertheless, as long as the Strategic Air Command's primary mission for its bombers
was that of nuclear deterrence, few recognized the wisdom in General Chain's words.[12]
We must recognize, however, that the capabilities of airpower, expressed in terms of lethality, precision, and
survivability, have changed so dramatically that Desert Storm must now serve as our benchmark for considering the
potential effectiveness of strategic air attack. This is not to suggest that the next and all subsequent wars will resemble
Desert Storm. While we cannot continue to judge the likely utility of strategic attack on the basis of campaigns that
ended more than five decades ago or upon the (mercifully untested) tenets of nuclear strategy, it is not sufficient to
state merely that traditional concepts are now invalid. We must seek to understand the present and future potential of
strategic air attack and how that mission will contribute to the goals of the joint force commander.
Toward a Definition of Strategic Air Attack
In defining contemporary strategic attack, it is imperative to understand first what the concept is not. Even though US
Strategic Command retains primary control of the nation's nuclear deterrent, strategic air attack is not necessarily a
nuclear attack. The experiences of Desert Storm and Deliberate Force (the air attacks on the Bosnian Serbs)
dramatically illustrate, after decades of Cold War neglect, the renaissance of conventional strategic attack in both
theory and practice. Yet many remain unable to separate the notion of "strategic airpower" from old concepts. Dr.
Arthur G. B. Metcalf, military editor of Strategic Review, wrote in the Spring 1991 issue of that journal that "the
manned penetrating bomber" was the "only usable strategic strike force we have" in the post-Cold War, non-nuclear
era. Dr. Metcalf's use of the term "bomber," however, plainly referred to the long-range heavies: the B-1, B-2, and B52. Even the article's title, "Strategic Airpower in Conventional Warfare: Some Considerations," suggests, even in the
immediate aftermath of Desert Storm, that "strategic" involves both "bomber" and "nuclear."[13]
Part of the defense community's problem in recognizing the changed nature of strategic attack is the result of
terminology. The term "strategic bombing," for example, has lost its utility. It carries a great deal of historical
baggage, and many historians and analysts have come to use it in a pejorative sense. Indeed, many who use "strategic
bombing" to describe an airpower mission often simply assume its meaning rather than define it. When analysts and
authors do attempt to clarify it, they often base their definitions on outdated theories and criteria. Pape, for example,
essentially defined strategic bombing by target sets. "Strategic bombing," he wrote, "attacks fixed military, industrial,
and civilian targets in and near political or economic centers."[14] But the realities of strategic attack have changed,
and we should relegate the term "strategic bombing," too long defined largely on the experience of World War II, to

the history books.
Recent experience shows that the target struck does not necessarily dictate the nature of the attack as "strategic." In
variable scenarios for the 21st century, Air Vice Marshal Mason has noted, "the method of attack and specific nature
of the target will be irrelevant to the definition." The effects of striking targets relating directly to the enemy's ability
and will to succeed by force can define a strategic attack. In Bosnia, for example, ammunition dumps were "strategic"
targets because of Bosnian Serb reliance on them to achieve their strategic objectives and their inability, as a result of
internationally sanctioned embargoes, to replace them. In the Gulf War, both President Bush and his field commander,
General Schwarzkopf, considered Saddam Hussein militarily and politically dependent on the Republican Guard. Air
strikes on these elite units therefore constituted a portion of the strategic air campaign. Contrast these perspectives to
the past, when airmen and soldiers alike generally considered ammunition dumps and fielded military units as
"tactical" targets, struck in support of surface operations already under way.[15]
Current Air Force doctrine acknowledges the need to avoid a prescriptive, "one-size-fits-all" approach to targeting.
The 1992 edition of Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, states that it is
"the objective sought--an effect on the war as a whole--[that] determines if a target or attack is strategic." Likewise,
the more recent October 1996 draft of Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.2, Strategic Attack, declares that "strategic
attack is not defined by the weapons or delivery systems used--their type, range, or destructiveness--but by their
effective contribution to directly achieving national or theater strategic objectives."[16] Thus, targets will be defined as
strategic or otherwise as a function of the nature of the opponent and the political and military objectives sought from
attacking those targets.
Furthermore, strategic air attack is not Douhetan "city-busting" or "terror-bombing." As noted earlier, technological
limitations, together with weather conditions and enemy defenses, often led to significant collateral damage from
strategic attacks in World War II. Today, precision weapons make area bombing only one of many options. Precision
weapons, however, offer no guarantees against civilian losses. The strike on the Al Firdos bunker in Baghdad was a
"precise" strike. Unfortunately, coalition planners did not know that on the night of 13 February 1991, the Iraqis were
using the upper floors of the bunker to shelter families. Despite the fact that the bunker was a legitimate target, the
consequent deaths of 200 to 300 civilians resulted in a sharp reduction in strikes against command and control and
other leadership targets. General Schwarzkopf himself thereafter reviewed any targets selected for attack in downtown
Baghdad.[17] More than four years later, NATO air operations against the Bosnian Serbs were remarkable for the
extraordinary efforts undertaken by planners and aircrews alike to avoid collateral damage and civilian deaths. These
are hardly the hallmarks of a Douhetan strategy.
The choice of attack platforms also reflects the radical shift in targeting capabilities. Many analysts continue to refer to
"strategic bombers" as a separate type of airframe. Certainly, some aircraft types are "long-range, heavy" bombers.
Bombing aircraft of an earlier period required a large payload to increase the probability that a single bomb would hit,
let alone destroy, the target. Historians noted the first sustained "role reversal" of strategic and tactical aircraft in
Vietnam when B-52s flew missions in support of ground operations while F-4s and F-105s flew against targets in the
North. In 1981, the Israelis used eight F-16s, each carrying two 2000-pound bombs, to attack and destroy the Iraqi
nuclear reactor at Osirak. In 1986, US Air Force F-111Fs, together with carrier-launched A-6s, A-7Es, and F/A-18s,
struck targets in Libya. Both raids were strategic in that they advanced major policy objectives of the Israeli and
American governments respectively. In the Gulf War, the misnamed F-117 Stealth "fighter," with an unrefueled
combat radius of 550 nautical miles, flew only two percent of strike sorties but struck nearly 40 percent of the targets
identified as "strategic" by planners and commanders.[18] There is no longer a necessary link between targets and
attack platforms. Today, each instance of the specific employment of any aircraft will determine if it is being used in a
strategic role.
If many of the traditional hallmarks of strategic air war are no longer valid, how can we define and plan for this vital
airpower mission? Contemporary strategic attacks do not aim to undermine the will of the people in expectation of a
popular uprising and collapse of the enemy government. Through the enhanced survivability of stealth and radically
increased lethality of precision weapons, airpower can attain strategic goals without resorting to massive assaults on
urban areas. In an important departure from classical theory, strategic attack now includes strikes against an enemy's
fielded forces. When strategic attack plans include infrastructure targets, such as command and control facilities,

electrical power stations, and transportation networks, the specific purpose may be to reduce the ability of an adversary
to resist further air and surface operations rather than affect the will of its citizens.
As noted earlier, AFM 1-1 states that strategic attacks seek to achieve an effect "on the war as a whole." Other analysts
suggest that effects which are "transformatory" and "game-changing" are inherently strategic in nature.[19] In that
sense, the struggle to achieve and maintain air superiority is, in its effects, a strategic attack. Few today would dispute
the notion that air superiority--and its more extreme form of air dominance--enables all other missions to take place
with reduced costs and greater efficiency, stealthy assets notwithstanding. The side that achieves air superiority and
then expands that to dominance gains untold advantages over its opponent. Air superiority, like strategic attack, is not
an end in itself. Insurgencies often succeed without it. Nevertheless, air superiority, properly exploited, is indeed
"game-changing" in conventional warfare. On that the historical record is clear.
Air superiority is a necessary precondition for further successful strategic air attacks. In an air force composed
primarily of non-stealthy platforms, strategic attacks do not necessarily, as some claim, bypass an enemy's "fielded
forces." The opponent's integrated air defense system, including its air units, are part of a nation's fielded forces.
Military forces may still employ long-range precision munitions, including cruise missiles, against strategic targets
before an enemy's defenses have been overwhelmed. But in the absence of air superiority, an air force attempting to
mount a sustained strategic attack, using large numbers of manned, non-stealthy platforms, would be forced to endure
significant levels of attrition. Most classical airpower theorists realized this; yet in the post-industrial era, when both
pilots and aircraft are expensive and increasingly rare commodities, no modern air force could long tolerate the heavy
losses such a strategy would produce.
This point is vital to understanding what strategic air attack now means. Surface commanders do not intentionally seek
the strongest point in the enemy's position and then hurl their forces against it. While classical airpower theorists
recognized the potential for significant losses in the air, they sought nevertheless to avoid a prolonged struggle of
attrition in the air like that experienced by land forces on the Western Front from 1914 to 1918. The concept of
strategic attack is to pit one's strengths against an enemy's weakness, to wage an asymmetrical strategy using our often
overwhelming capabilities in the air. Once deprived of an effective air defense, the enemy's forces, however strong on
the ground, will have to suffer unremitting attacks. Strikes against the enemy's supporting infrastructure would
likewise impose a tremendous strain on his ability to sustain and strengthen his forces in the field.
Strategic-level goals shape the target sets for strategic campaigns. Thus, direct attacks on an adversary's fielded forces
will not fulfill every war aim. As in the Gulf War, strategic goals may include eliminating an enemy's capability to
produce weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The desired postwar end state may include rendering an opponent
incapable of threatening its neighbors. Under these circumstances, attacks against known WMD facilities take on
strategic significance. The destruction of certain infrastructure targets such as electrical generating plants would inhibit
or at least slow a nation's recovery of regional power status, thereby diminishing for a while the risk of regional
conflict.
Surprisingly, JCS Publication 1-02 continues to define strategic air warfare in terms of target systems rather than
outcomes. Certainly attacks against "key manufacturing systems," "sources of raw material," or "key agricultural areas"
may be appropriate in some situations. In the case of Deliberate Force, however, air planners purposely avoided
inflicting extensive damage on Bosnia's infrastructure. Widespread destruction, though within NATO's capability,
would have undermined the strategic goal of reconciliation and reconstruction sought by the United States and its
allies. Nevertheless, in many instances, defeating an enemy's short-term military strategy or its field armies can create
conditions necessary, if not sufficient, to the success of US or allied strategy. Thus, air attacks remain an important
means of fulfilling strategic goals. The particular platform or the specific target is not the issue; the effects sought and
the linkage of such attacks to national or coalition strategic objectives will define such missions as "strategic."
Early airpower theorists believed that strategic air attacks alone could bring an enemy to his knees and thereby avoid a
surface encounter. Indeed, there are doubtless some airmen who continue to view this as a likely, as opposed to a
desirable, outcome of a strategic air campaign. As with the 1986 raid on Libya in Operation El Dorado Canyon or the
Israeli raid on Osirak, airpower may serve as the sole means employed to fulfill a strategic objective. Still, as Air Vice
Marshal Mason has noted, "The concept [of strategic attack] should be extended to include activities which can

subsequently be exploited by ground forces in greatly reduced numbers, with greatly reduced casualties, and greatly
reduced costs."[20] Current Air Force doctrine considers that strategic air campaigns serve "the overall war effort,
seeking maximum leverage upon the opponent by using the most direct means available."[21] Today, strategic air
attacks are not necessarily an "independent" campaign waged in pursuit of "victory through airpower." Arguments
over whether air can "do it all" in every situation only produce pointless debates of a non-issue.
Strategic attack also remains a vital part of contemporary operational art. A strategic air campaign provides synergy,
defined in Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, as applying "force from different dimensions to shock,
disrupt, and defeat opponents." It brings "simultaneity and depth" to a campaign by "bringing force to bear on the
opponent's entire structure in a near simultaneous manner to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and the
enemy's will to resist." Strategic attacks provide "leverage"--that is, gaining, maintaining, and exploiting "advantages
in combat power across all dimensions." Depending on the nature of the enemy and our own goals, strategic attack can
fulfill these and other characteristics of operational art by itself or as part of a joint force.[22] Those who believe, as
Pape does, that "strategic bombing won't matter in the future" base their conclusions on an outdated and invalid
understanding of this airpower mission and its place in contemporary joint warfare.[23]
Over the course of eight and a half decades and wars large and small, airmen have developed and refined the theories
and doctrine of strategic air warfare. Perhaps the most important element of these theories that has survived the test of
time is airpower's ability to achieve strategic effects either independently of or in conjunction with other military
forces. Thus, in the post-Gulf War environment, the following definition for strategic attack may be useful: "The
offensive employment of airpower assets to allow the joint force to achieve a decision with minimum contact between
opposing military forces, by striking targets that most generally and directly relate to the opponent's ability to maintain
forces in the field as well as his will to resist. Such operations also directly fulfill national, multinational, or theater
strategic-level objectives."
Implications
Given this understanding of the changed nature of air warfare, what capabilities must we continue to pursue and
exploit to retain the capacity to employ airpower in strategic attack missions? First, the United States must continue to
develop and deploy stealthy platforms such as the F-117 and the B-2, for even though a counter to stealth is likely in
the offing, low observability would certainly enhance any airpower mission's chances of achieving surprise and
success. The F-117s employed in Desert Storm did not require the large support packages of other non-stealthy
aircraft. Furthermore, as Eliot Cohen and Thomas Keaney have noted, the F-117 provided "stealth" to a much larger
portion of the coalition's air force by disabling the Iraqi air defense system, thereby making subsequent raids harder to
detect and counter. While not all adversaries will have sophisticated integrated air defense systems, pursuit of stealth
and low observability technologies will pay dividends through increased efficiency and reduced losses.[24]
Second, we should continue to pursue improvements in precision guided munitions (PGMs). Precision munitions open
up to attack all manner of target systems, including command and control facilities located in urban areas, hardened
aircraft shelters, and enemy armor formations in the field. These weapons, coupled with stealthy platforms, proved
fatal to much of Iraq's command and control network as well as its air defense system. Likewise, considering the
political tensions involved and the need to avoid inflicting widespread destruction in Bosnia, only the availability of
PGMs made NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs feasible in the first place. The majority of weapons expended
by NATO air forces during Operation Deliberate Force were precision munitions. The "thousand-fold increase in
destructive power" and the "near-zero-miss-distance accuracies" of PGMs rapidly provided the leverage NATO
required to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate in good faith. The precision munitions employed in both the Gulf
and in Bosnia had their limitations; smoke, fog, and overcast skies made laser designation virtually impossible. Yet
next-generation munitions like the Joint Direct Attack Munition and sensor-fused "smart" weapons promise to
overcome many of these limits.[25] Indeed, long-range precision guided weapons can increase the tempo, intensity,
and scope of strategic attack at the outset of a conflict while the battle for air superiority may still be underway.
Other technical requirements of successful strategic air warfare are equally relevant to other airpower missions. The
need to process information rapidly and accurately will increase as the amount of data available to planners and
commanders increases. In the absence of all-stealthy air forces, suppression of enemy air defense assets remains a vital

component of any air campaign or operation. Future generations of unmanned aerial vehicles, known as uninhabited
combat vehicles, will give planners expanded options with minimal risk across the spectrum of airpower missions.
High value assets such as air refueling tankers, AWACS, and JSTARS are the types of weapon systems that both
enable and enhance the effectiveness of strategic attack and other airpower missions in a variety of scenarios.
Control of the ultimate high ground, space, may become in the future the final arbiter in the success or failure of
military operations, including strategic attack. In the Gulf War, for example, coalition forces relied heavily on
information provided by space-based systems. These assets, Lawrence Freedman wrote, "identified targets, worked out
their coordinates, helped choose the weapons system best placed to attack them, passed on the orders to attack,
provided mid-course corrections to ensure accuracy and then checked afterwards to ensure that everything had gone
according to plan."[26] Indeed, past failures of air attacks to achieve strategic effects were often the result of faulty or
incomplete intelligence. Contemporary air and space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems offer
air planners more accurate target information than was possible even a decade ago. Still, determining the effects of a
strategic attack or an enemy's reaction to it remains an inexact science at best.
Many observers proclaimed the Gulf War the "first space war." As demonstrated in Desert Storm, strategic attacks will
rely increasingly on real-time data to find and destroy or neutralize non-fixed targets. Effective bomb damage
assessment, with data derived in part from space, is essential to ensure that sorties are not wasted against inoperative
targets, but are flown against other objectives which the enemy has rebuilt. Clearly, depriving an enemy of "situational
awareness" can have strategic effects when such action is coordinated with devastating strikes against infrastructure
targets as well as against forces in the field. While the arguments surrounding the militarization of space are beyond
the scope of this article, one should bear in mind the importance of space-based assets to surface and aerial combat
operations. At some point, however, we must face the prospect that a peer competitor will possess the ability to remove
our space-based "eyes" while gaining data from his own systems for use against us. Without friendly access to
information from such systems, would Saddam's forces have fared better? Certainly the coalition might have
conducted operations differently and arguably with less efficiency.
And what of the much-maligned "strategic" bomber? If a variety of less expensive and more numerous platforms can
achieve strategic effects, why retain heavy bombers? The answer to this question is less clear than it might first appear.
Consider:

. There can be no assurance that future administrations or joint force commanders will never again require a longrange, heavy platform capable of striking targets from outside the theater.

. We will not always have advance notice of hostile actions or other warnings that will allow us to position shortrange assets in anticipation of conflict.

. A future El Dorado Canyon-style strike might require the use of air assets based in the United States, in the absence
of permission from other nations to use their soil to launch a one-time raid against a rogue state or even to fly across
their territory.

. Our future foes may not all be geographically compact.
. Short-range assets, even with one or two refuelings, may not be capable of hitting targets deep within a large, welldefended nation.
General Chuck Horner, as un-Douhetan an airman as one is likely to find, personally felt the effects of a lack of longrange, heavy, and stealthy aircraft during the first tense days of the Gulf crisis in 1990. Though he clearly recognized
that airpower would not "win it all" in the Gulf War, he nonetheless acknowledged the value of assets such as the B-2
which combine payload, accuracy, reach, and low observability.[27] There are sensible reasons why we shouldn't
assume the risk of discarding this capability, especially if the decision were to rest on an outdated and flawed
understanding of strategic attack. Shrinking capabilities within the defense technical and industrial base also caution

against closing off the long-range bomber option.
Despite the passage of time and enormous technological change, both advocates and skeptics of strategic attack
continue to use the vision of interwar airpower pioneers as their benchmark for measuring that mission's success or
failure. Ironically, Air Force Manual 1-1 described nearly five years ago much of what this article contains. Still,
whether or not strategic airpower "worked" from 1939 to 1991 remains an issue for debate in academic and military
journals. What does seem clear is that the discussion of strategic airpower remains mired in theories from 1930 and
images from 1945. To address America's defense needs for the next century, we must move beyond academic
quibbling and consider instead what assets technology may provide for future strategic attack. The intellectual distance
between Operation Desert Storm and Operation Pointblank, the combined bombing offensive against Germany in
World War II, is far greater than the five decades that separated them.
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